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Conservation Payments: Challenges in Design and Implementation
Abstract
As Congress develops new farm legislation, some are lobbying for a new partnership between U.S. taxpayers
and farmers. In exchange for an annual transfer of $10 to $20billion from taxpayers to agriculture, farmers
would do much more to enhance environmental quality. An attractive feature of a new partnership is that
paying for an improved environment provides a clear and justifiable rationale for farm program payments,
something that is lacking under current farm programs. By changing management practices and land use,
farmers can provide cleaner water, cleaner air, better wildlife habitat, lower net greenhouse gas emissions, and
improved long-run soil quality. Private profit maximizers largely ignore the value of these environmental
goods. Hence, the goods are underprovided. Having government step in to increase their supply may increase
economic efficiency. New, highly funded conservation payment programs for agriculture could achieve both
the current income support objective of farm programs as well as environmental objectives if program
payments are targeted to achieve environmental benefits rather than targeted to low-income producers.
Significant reductions in environmental benefits will occur if payment limits or means testing is used to target
payments, unless low-income farmers provide the highest environmental benefits. For many farms, the
potential quantity of environmental benefits that can be produced is proportionate to farm acreage. The two
basic approaches to conservation payments are (1) voluntary programs that pay farmers for specific actions
they take, and (2) programs that penalize farmers with taxes or disqualification from other program benefits if
prescribed actions are not followed. The first approach is preferred if agricultural income enhancement is a
goal. Also, it is doubtful that the second approach is political feasible given that farmers will be asked to give
up the ?no strings? income support they have enjoyed in recent years. Past conservation programs have taught
us three key lessons. The first is that making payments based on environmental benefit-to-cost ratios can
greatly enhance program efficiency by either cutting the cost of meeting an environmental objective or by
greatly increasing the amount of environmental benefits that can be obtained from a given expenditure.
Second, adequate verification, monitoring, and enforcement programs will need to be put in place if the
promised environmental benefits are to be realized. And third, land set-asides are the most costly way of
obtaining environmental benefits. When possible, it is more efficient to encourage productive use of land
rather than to retire land. So, for example, instead of paying a farmer to remove land from production in order
to reduce nitrate water pollution, a program would pay the farmer to adopt practices that reduce the risk of
fertilizer runoff.
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As Congress develops new farm legisla-
tion, some are lobbying for a new partnership 
between U.S. taxpayers and farmers. In 
exchange for an annual transfer of $10 to $20 
billion from taxpayers to agriculture, farmers 
would do much more to enhance environ-
mental quality. An attractive feature of a new 
partnership is that paying for an improved 
environment provides a clear and justifiable 
rationale for farm program payments, some-
thing that is lacking under current farm 
programs. By changing management prac-
tices and land use, farmers can provide 
cleaner water, cleaner air, better wildlife 
habitat, lower net greenhouse gas emissions, 
and improved long-run soil quality. Private 
profit maximizers largely ignore the value of 
these environmental goods. Hence, the goods 
are underprovided. Having government step 
in to increase their supply may increase 
economic efficiency. 
New, highly funded conservation payment 
programs for agriculture could achieve both 
the current income support objective of farm 
programs as well as environmental objectives 
if program payments are targeted to achieve 
environmental benefits rather than targeted to 
low-income producers. Significant reductions 
in environmental benefits will occur if pay-
ment limits or means testing is used to target 
payments, unless low-income farmers provide 
the highest environmental benefits. For many 
farms, the potential quantity of environmental 
benefits that can be produced is proportionate 
to farm acreage. 
The two basic approaches to conserva-
tion payments are (1) voluntary programs 
that pay farmers for specificactions they 
take, and (2) programs that penalize farmers 
with taxes or disqualification from other 
program benefits if prescribed actions are 
not followed. The first approach is preferred 
if agricultural income enhancement is a 
goal. Also, it is doubtful that the second 
approach is political feasible given that 
farmers will be asked to give up the “no 
strings” income support they have enjoyed 
in recent years. 
Past conservation programs have taught 
us three key lessons. The first is that making 
payments based on environmental benefit-
to-cost ratios can greatly enhance program 
efficiency by either cutting the cost of 
meeting an environmental objective or by 
greatly increasing the amount of environ-
mental benefits that can be obtained from a 
given expenditure. Second, adequate verifi-
cation, monitoring, and enforcement pro-
grams will need to be put in place if the 
promised environmental benefits are to be 
realized. And third, land set-asides are the 
most costly way of obtaining environmental 
benefits. When possible, it is more efficient 
to encourage productive use of land rather 
than to retire land. So, for example, instead 
of paying a farmer to remove land from 
production in order to reduce nitrate water 
pollution, a program would pay the farmer 






CHALLENGES IN DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
I. Introduction 
OVER THE LAST TWO years, Congress and 
farm groups have worked to find a farm bill 
formula that would be acceptable as a 
foundation for the next farm bill. Most ideas 
that have been floated—and that are finding 
some favor in the House of Representa-
tives—largely continue the general thrust of 
current programs: some fixed payments, 
guaranteed prices for farmers, and perhaps a 
new countercyclical program that would 
largely duplicate the emergency market loss 
assistance payments that have been made the 
last three years. 
Critics point out that the only policy ob-
jective consistent with current programs is 
stabilization of national net farm income. 
Rural activists and taxpayer groups note that 
because there are no means tests for the 
government subsidies, the largest farms and 
the wealthiest of farmers get the bulk of aid. 
But supporters of current programs counter 
that if we want to support sectoral income, 
then we need to support large farms (and 
sometimes wealthy farmers) because most 
production is carried out on large farms. The 
heart of the disagreement over farm pro-
grams is a disagreement over what the 
programs are supposed to accomplish, 
beyond a political response to rent-seeking 
activities. What exactly are taxpaying 
citizens receiving for the billions of dollars 
annually sent to agriculture? What broad 
public purpose is being met or which public 
goods are being purchased by the aid? When 
asked this question, supporters of current  
programs answer with “cheap food,” “help 
with risk management,” or “to keep people 
on the land.” But the food stamp program 
already guarantees that most Americans 
have access to affordable food. And the 
federal crop insurance program has been 
greatly expanded in recent years, both in 
product offerings and in subsidies. 
So the only broad public purpose we are 
left with is to keep people on the land. For 
what purpose? One is to maintain the vitality 
of rural communities. The other is to manage 
lands more carefully from an environmental 
stewardship perspective than they would be 
managed if farms were larger. From a public 
good perspective, it seems that the only 
possible public good justifications for farm 
programs are maintenance of rural popula-
tions and environmental stewardship.  
Many argue that farm programs are poor 
rural development tools because the econo-
mies of most rural communities are increas-
ingly becoming less farm dependent. The 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
states that only 45 rural counties can be 
classified as “farm dependent.”  Farm 
programs can, however, deliver significant 
environmental benefits. The Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP), for example, has 
evolved into a program that helps protect 
water quality and enhance wildlife habitat.  
If Congress chooses to reorient farm pro-
grams to enhance environmental quality, as  
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advocated by Senator Tom Harkin, what 
kinds of programs would be adopted? 
What environmental goods should be 
purchased? How feasible is it to deliver 
environmental quality through USDA farm 
programs? Can an income support objec-
tive be reconciled with an environmental 
quality objective in a new farm program? 
Congress will need answers to these 
questions before a refocusing of farm 
programs can be made. This paper con-
tributes to the discussion by considering 
the broad set of issues associated with the 
design and implementation of conservation 
payment schemes in the hopes of provid-
ing those charged with designing such 
programs a notion of the issues and trade-
offs involved. 
First, we present a brief primer on the 
economic efficiency basis for conservation 
payments and a discussion of the envi-
ronmental services available from agricul-
ture. Next, we discuss the potential policy 
goals that might motivate conservation 
payments, with particular emphasis on 
income support and its implications for the 
design of an efficient conservation payment 
program. We follow with a discussion of the 
issues that will need to be addressed in the 
design and implementation of a conservation 
payment program. We conclude with lessons 
from past federal conservation programs and 
a look to the empirical environmental 
economics literature for insight into the 
possible costs and environmental benefits of 
a conservation payment program.
 
II. The Economic and Environmental Basis  
for Conservation Payments 
We begin with a brief, general discussion of 
why government involvement, in the form 
of conservation payments or other policy 
measures, may be necessary to assure 
adequate provision of environmental goods 
in the agricultural sector.  
Economic Efficiency as a Basis for 
Conservation Payments 
The primary economic arguments support-
ing conservation payments are based on 
their potential ability to correct two well-
known failures of the free market system: 
externalities and public goods. The term 
“externality” is used to describe a situation 
in which the actions of an individual or 
group inadvertently affect the well being of 
another individual or group. In the market 
setting, externalities are costs borne by a 
third party not involved in a market trans-
action. Consequently, externalities are costs 
that often get overlooked in market deci-
sions, but because they are the true costs of 
the market activity, they should not be. A 
classic example of an externality is pollu-
tion from a factory or farm. 
A farmer who applies pesticides and/or 
fertilizer to increase crop yields may generate 
an externality in the form of runoff of some 
of the pesticides or fertilizer into local 
waterways. The decline in downstream water 
quality from runoff is a cost of farm produc-
tion that generally does not get captured in 
the market system; thus, government action 
to correct this externality may be justified. 
This side effect of agricultural production 
generates social costs (in the form of lower 
water quality) that are real and should be 
considered in the farmer’s fertilizer and 
pesticides application decisions, as well as 
other decisions, such as what crops to plant. 
As is typical of externalities, farmers did 
not intend to inflict harm on their neighbors; 
such external costs are just a by-product of 
farming operations.1 Nonetheless, external 
costs are generated by their activities and, 
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for efficiency’s sake, the costs should be 
incorporated into farming decisions. Thus, 
one justification for government action in 
agriculture is to make sure that externalities 
are incorporated into market decisions.  
Conservation payments can correct the 
externality market failure by paying farmers 
to adopt practices that produce fewer or none 
of these negative externalities. Paying 
farmers to adopt practices that reduce soil 
erosion should yield improvements in water 
quality. Likewise, if the externalities are 
positive (if they provide a beneficial effect on 
the environment), payments can be structured 
such that practices that produce more of the 
positive externalities are encouraged. 
It is important to note that a strong ar-
gument could also be made that generators 
of negative externalities should be taxed for 
generating the externality rather than paid 
not to do so. From an economic efficiency 
perspective, these two approaches may be 
the same in that they both, appropriately 
structured, have the potential to cause 
reductions in negative externalities and 
increases in positive ones.2 However, the 
two approaches offer very significant 
differences to the income of farmers 
involved as well as to taxpayers. It’s also 
important to note that the externalities are 
not eliminated by either payments or taxes; 
the externalities associated with farming 
still exist, but their costs are incorporated 
into decision making and thus more so-
cially appropriate levels of the externalities 
are generated. 
The presence of externalities that are not 
internalized into market decisions provides a 
clear basis for conservation payments. A 
second justification for intervention is the 
presence of “public goods” associated with 
agriculture. In addition to side effects associ-
ated with agricultural production, farmers can  
make land use choices that generate envi-
ronmental benefits through, for example, 
retaining or creating wetlands, building and 
maintaining buffer strips, and preserving 
farmscapes. These are examples of public 
goods provided by agriculture. When the 
consumption of a good by one person does 
not diminish the enjoyment of the good by 
another, and when people cannot be pre-
vented from consuming the good, then the 
good is said to be a “public” good. 
Private markets exist when the willing-
ness to pay for a good exceeds the cost of 
bringing the good to market. But private 
markets generally cannot supply public 
goods efficiently. This is due to the funda-
mental nature of public goods—once they 
are provided everyone can enjoy them 
whether they pay for them or not. Therefore, 
it is often difficult to establish a market in 
which fees can be collected to cover the cost 
of providing these services. Thus, the 
provision of public goods from agriculture is 
another strong justification for government 
policies such as conservation payments to 
encourage provision of these goods, as 
private markets cannot generally be relied 
upon to provide them. 
An important caveat is in order. Just be-
cause an externality or public good is 
present, it does not necessarily follow that 
government intervention to provide the 
public good or internalize the externality is 
appropriate. If the costs of correcting the 
market failure (perhaps through establishing 
an agency with regulatory authority and 
enforcing a standard) are larger than the 
benefits of doing so, society is better off by 
doing nothing. Thus, the use of market 
failure arguments such as externalities and 
public goods only provide a basis for the use 
of conservation payments if the benefits of 
public good provision and/or negative 
externality reduction are “large.” 
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Externalities and Public Goods           
from Agriculture 
In this section, we document a variety of 
externalities and public goods that agricul-
ture generates. This treatment is not meant 
to be exhaustive, only suggestive of the 
many environmental consequences of 
agriculture that may warrant conservation 
payments. Agriculture’s environmental 
impacts are increasingly well documented. 
For careful reviews see Cox (2001) and 
Claassen et al. (2001). Table 1 contains a list 
of public goods and externalities commonly 
associated with agriculture.  
Complexity and Interrelationships 
between Environmental Services       
from Agriculture 
Before completing our brief discussion of 
environmental effects of agricultural opera-
tions, it is important to note that these effects 
are complex and may be highly interrelated.3 
In some cases the correlation is positive. 
Clear air, clean water, wildlife habitat, 
preservation of biodiversity, and other natural 
resource values are in most cases achieved 
jointly. The preservation of a wetland, for 
example, produces clean water, habitat for a 
variety of bird species and other wildlife and 
provides opportunities for outdoor recreation. 
Policies that are intended to provide a single 
environmental benefit will in all likelihood 
produce other complementary benefits. If 
environmental goods are produced jointly, the 
anticipated benefit from the provision of a 
single good will underestimate the total social 
benefit that is obtained. 
In contrast, cases may arise in which the 
provision of a particular environmental 
benefit reduces other environmental benefits. 
A restored wetland, for example, can estab- 
lish valuable bird habitat but the associated 
change in soil properties may increase 
emissions of nitrous oxide, a greenhouse gas. 
Likewise, conventional tillage is considered 
more damaging to bird populations than no-
till, as it leaves less cover on the ground and 
necessitates more field operations. However, 
no-till tends to be more pesticide intensive 
and can therefore negatively affect water 
quality. Because the water quality effects can 
be both large scale and long term, they may 
be overlooked in the process of increasing 
wildlife habitat. Policies that alter the effects 
of agricultural activities on wildlife are also 
very likely to affect species differently. Some 
species will benefit while some will be 
negatively affected.  
Complementarity and conflicts in the 
provision of environmental goods favor an 
approach to environmental policy that is 
inclusive. An inclusive policy approach will 
result in a more efficient allocation of public 
resources. Consider a simple example. 
Suppose a cost-benefit analysis is carried out 
to assess a policy to place buffer strips along 
stream banks. The cost that is borne by the 
farmer is the foregone net revenue that could 
have been realized if the land were kept in 
cultivation. A key benefit of the buffer strip 
is its beneficial impact on stream water 
quality. However, buffer strips can also 
enhance wildlife habitat and foster plant and 
animal biodiversity. Ignoring these comple-
mentary benefits would result in a cost-
benefit ratio that was biased upward, and 
could inappropriately lead to rejection of a 
social-welfare-improving environmental 
policy. Fundamentally, the entire range of 
benefits associated with alternative practices 
should be addressed rather than focusing on 
single environmental targets.
  
TABLE 1. Public goods and externalities associated with agriculture 
Externality  Primary Cause(s) External Effect(s) Location Empirical Evidence 
I. Water Quality 
Nutrient Runoff  Fertilization in excess of 
plant uptake 
At low concentrations: variety of distur-
bances of natural ecosystems, flora, and 
fauna in affected waters affecting wildlife 
populations, biodiversity, recreational 
opportunities, and aesthetic aspects of 
water; At higher concentrations also: 
human health threat, i.e., nitrite poisoning 
(infants) and increased rates of cancer 
Downstream located 
water streams in-
cluding ground and 
subsurface water 
streams 
According to a 1988-90 survey of 
drinking water wells, nitrates are 
found in more than a half of the 
94,600 community water system 
wells, and in almost 60% of the 10.5 
million rural domestic wells (Claas-
sen et al. 2001). 
Water Erosion Temporary removal of 
vegetation cover of soils, 
especially through tillage 
on sloped land 
Sedimentation, siltation, hypoxia, long-run 
soil fertility loss 
 
Downstream located 
water streams  
Maintenance dredging of sediments at 
federal navigation channels in the 
Great Lakes costs over $20 million 
annually. The costs and controversy 
for managing dredged material can 
be even more substantial (The U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers). 
Pesticides Field applications of pesti-
cides, air application and 
windy weather increase 
drift, heavy rainfall follow-
ing application increase 
water contamination 
Increased mortality among nontarget 
organisms (bees, fish, fish consumers), 
increased health threat for organisms on 
higher food chain levels than fish (includ-
ing humans), increased pest resil-
ience/resistance, human health threat from 
direct exposure to these chemicals; Some 
effects may be caused by metabolized 
chemicals which are more dangerous than 
the original active ingredient 
Downstream located 
water streams in-
cluding ground and 
subsurface water 
streams 
Airborne effects are 
local 
At least one of 7 major herbicides 
(atrazine, cyanazine, simazine, 
alachlor, metolachlor, prometon, 
and acetochlor) was found in 37% 
of the groundwater sites examined 
by USGS but all at low concentra-
tions (Barbash et al. 1989, as cited 
by Claassen et al. 2001).  
Hypoxia Fertilization in excess of 
plant uptake (phosphorous 
and nitrogen); Soil erosion 
promoting practices 
Increased nutrient concentration, enhanced 
algae growth, increased algae deposition at 
bottom of water body, increased bacterial 
decomposition of deposited algae, in-
creased rates of oxygen removal by bacte-
rial activity, increased fish mortality from 
lower oxygen availability  
Primarily still waters 
located downstream 
of heavily fertilized 
fields  
Agricultural sources are estimated to 
contribute about 65% of the nitrogen 
loads entering the Gulf of Mexico 
from the Mississippi Basin (Goolsby 
et al. 1999, as cited by Claassen et al. 
2001). Aral lake has shrunk about 4% 
for the last 25 years and will soon 
vanish (National Geographic ****) 
 
 
TABLE 1. Continued 
II. Restoration and Preservation of Natural Habitat 






Conversion of natural 
wetlands and prairies into 
cropland; Use of farming 
techniques that leave little 
or no vegetation cover 
from harvest to planting 
next crop 
Reduction in biodiversity because many 
organisms depend on wetlands, prairies, 
and riparian zones for feeding, breeding, 
and shelter  
Globally effective Agricultural wetland conversions 
averaged 31,000 acres per year in 
1982-1992 (Heimlich et al. 1998, 
as sited in Claassen et al. 2001). 
Agriculture has been a factor in 
the decline of 380 of the 663 
species federally listed as threat-
ened or endangered in the U.S. 
(USDA-ERS 1997, as cited in 
Claassen et al. 2001) 




Use of “traditional” farming 
practices and structures. 
Traditional barns and other farm structures, 
windbreaks, and alternative conservation 
practices are “eye pleasing”. 
Local 
 
Although difficult to quantify, more 
than 60% of agricultural produc-
tion, by value, is produced in 
metropolitan counties or counties 
adjacent to metropolitan counties. 
This implies that large numbers of 
people have ready access to such 
aesthetic amenities. 
IV. Global Climate Change 
Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions 
Direct fossil fuel use via 
agricultural machinery, 
indirect fossil fuel use 
through agricultural 
inputs, reduction of soil 
organic matter, 
deforestation, enteric 
fermentation of ruminant 
livestock, livestock 
manure (handling)  
Global temperature increase, changes in 
precipitation, wind, and storm patterns, rise 
of sea level, habitat changes, extermination 
of species, change in crop yields 
Globally effective, 
negative effects more 
likely in topical and 
subtropical climates; 
Positive effects more 
likely in temperate and 
tundra climates 
In 1996, U.S. agricultural activities 
were responsible for 114 million 
metric tons of carbon equivalent, 
or about 6% of total U.S. green-
house gas emissions. Worldwide, 
the agriculture sector produces 
about 50% and 75% of anthropo-
genic CH4 and N2O emissions and 
about 5% of anthropogenic CO2 
emissions. 
Carbon  
   Sequestration 
Reduced tillage, Conver-
sion of cultivated land to 
grassland or forest, Tree 
planting 
Temporary absorption of carbon dioxide from 
the atmosphere, Mitigation of greenhouse 
gas emission externality as long as soil 
carbon accumulates or trees accumulate 
biomass 
Same as for greenhouse 
gas emission externality 
Growing trees sequester about 1 




TABLE 1. Continued 
Biomass Energy crop plantations 
(switchgrass, hybrid 
poplar, willow, eucalyp-
tus, crop residues, 
cornstarch); Processing 
of biomass harvest into 
ethanol or electricity 
Reduction in fossil fuel use; Recycling of 
emissions; Mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emission externality 
Same as for green- 
house gas emission 
externality 
Hybrid-Poplar-fed power plants 
reduce carbon emissions by 95 
percent per electrical energy unit 
relative to coal power plant 
V. Air Quality 
Wind Erosion Temporary removal of 
vegetation cover of soils 
in windy areas 
Sedimentation on neighboring lands, 
machinery damage, increased capital 
deterioration /cleaning cost from soiling,  
Local; The smaller the soil 
particle and the higher 
the wind force, the 
farther soil particles can 
be carried away 
According to the 1992 National 
Resources Inventory (NRI), the 
estimated annual soil loss from 
wind erosion on nonfederal rural 
land in the United States was 2.5 
tons per acre per year (SCS 1994). 
Livestock odors Concentrated livestock 
facilities 
Human discomfort, decrease in  
residential value 
Local Livestock odor has been an 
increasing public concern. How-
ever, since the emission and 
dispersion of gases and particu-
lates are not fully understood, we 
cannot reliably predict the envi-
ronmental impact of current 




Burning of crop residue 
after harvest 
Release of smoke particles and health 
threatening substances including lung-
damaging and carcinogenic substances; 
Decreased visibility, intensifies green-
house gas emission externality through 
nitrous oxide and carbon emissions 
Local Crop residue burning is a net source 
of methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
(N2O), carbon monoxide (CO), 
and nitrogen oxides (NOx), which 
are released during combustion. 
Annual emissions from this 
source over the period 1990 
through 1999 averaged approxi-
mately 27 Gg of CH4, 1 Gg of 
N2O, 704 Gg of CO, and 30 Gg of 
NOx. (USEPA). 
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III. The Goal(s) of Agricultural Policy and Conservation Payments 
Improving the environmental performance 
of agriculture has emerged recently as an 
important goal of U.S. agricultural policy. 
For example, farmers have been paid to set 
aside environmentally sensitive land from 
production and to change their farming 
practices in ways that enhance environ-
mental performance. Farm-income support 
continues to be another important policy 
objective. In this section we discuss the 
challenges facing policy makers who wish 
to design and implement a conservation 
payments program. The advantages and 
disadvantages of alternative program 
elements are understood best when related 
to a specific policy objective. For this 
purpose, and for the purpose of clarifying 
the presentation, we list three key objec-
tives that appear to be relevant to designing 
sound conservation payments policy.  
1. Improve environmental quality in a 
way that provides the largest benefit 
to the citizens of the United States. 
2. Minimize all costs of administering 
the conservation payments program.  
3. Support farm income levels. 
Several comments about Objectives 1-3 
are in order. First, each is admittedly vague. 
Second, the objectives do not exhaust the 
possible goals that may be important or may 
be incorporated into a U.S. conservation 
payments policy. Finally, Objectives 1 and 2 
combined relate the idea that sound policy 
should be designed with careful considera-
tion to principles of economic efficiency. In 
other words, the policy that is selected from 
among the set of policies considered to be 
feasible should provide the greatest net 
benefit to the citizens of the United States, 
where net benefit is defined as the total 
value of the environmental improvements 
generated, less the total opportunity costs of 
the resources foregone in achieving the 
improvements. We decompose net benefits 
into benefit generation, Objective 1, and 
program cost minimization, Objective 2, 
only to clarify the discussion of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of alternative policy 
design elements. 
In the next section we discuss the degree 
to which multiple policy objectives can be 
met with the single policy instrument of 
conservation payments. We also discuss two 
additional policies issues. The first relates to 
the fact that different regions of the country 
also have different environmental concerns 
and income distributions, resulting in 
different goals for farm policy. Second, we 
consider the consistency of conservation 
payments with the goals of international 
agricultural policy.  
Dual Goals for Conservation Payments: 
Environmental Benefits and Income 
Support 
 Some critical questions must be asked when 
considering conservation payments policy: 
Can environmental payments alone meet 
income support goals? Is the distribution of 
payments that would result from an efficient 
conservation payments program “desirable” 
from an income support perspective? What 
alternative targeting strategies might yield a 
more desirable distribution of program 
payments?  
A farm program based entirely on envi-
ronmental concerns should target programs 
on farmland that can provide the highest 
environmental services at the lowest cost, 
that is, focus exclusively on Objectives 1 
and 2 (more will be said on the idea of 
targeting in Section IV). Moreover, in a 
program intended to deal strictly with 
environmental concerns, there would be no 
reason to offer farmers payment for services 
above the cost of providing them. Thus, 
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competitive bidding for payment of envi-
ronmental services and/or taxing those who 
cause externalities would be natural instru-
ments. In contrast, if conservation pay-
ments are to be used for transferring 
income to the agricultural sector, then it 
does not really matter who receives the 
payments unless Congress changes course 
and adopts means testing for payment 
eligibility. If means tests are adopted then 
payments should be targets so that low-
income farmers benefit the most. This 
might be accomplished in a conservation 
payments program by restricting participa-
tion to particular types of farm operations. 
If means tests are not adopted then the 
dual goals of income support and conserva-
tion are not in conflict because it is the 
aggregate level of payments that meets the 
income support objective, not who receives 
them. With means tests, the ideal targets of 
conservation payments under the dual goals 
of income assistance and conservation 
would be farmers with both low income and 
high conservation efficiency, where high 
conservation efficiency indicates the poten-
tial for large environmental benefits relative 
to other farmers. Providing payment in 
excess of the costs of these services can 
meet both policy goals when low-income 
farmers have significant environmental 
services to offer. However, a trade-off will 
have to be made when low-income farmers 
have few environmental services to offer or 
farmers with significant environmental 
services have high income. 
When income support is provided 
through conservation payments, it may be 
possible to eliminate or at least cut back 
other distortionary income support pro-
grams. Lynch and Smith (1994) summarize 
these potential benefits and note that, among 
other advantages, conservation payments 
can provide income support without intro-
ducing output price distortions, and they 
avoid land retirements, thus having less of 
an effect on commodity production and 
supply. However, several challenges exist in 
designing a conservation payments program 
to generate these advantages. 
First, the overlap between farmers with 
low income and high conservation services 
may be low. Claassen et al. (2001) show that 
targeting payments to support the incomes 
of any specific group of farmers is unlikely 
to solve any given environmental problem, 
which implies that targeting only low-
income farms may not serve the goal of 
conservation very well. They also show that 
targeting any specific environmental prob-
lem may exclude many producers that 
qualify for income support.  
Second, program designers may have 
difficulty designing a politically acceptable 
conservation program that focuses too 
explicitly on income. Paying high-income 
farms less for the same conservation ser-
vices likely will be difficult to justify. Caps 
on total payments to farms can partly 
accomplish this, but not without achieving 
fewer environmental services. On the other 
hand, farm programs have been criticized for 
transferring too much income to large and 
wealthy farms, so such caps may well be 
politically feasible. 
Scale and Regional Trade-offs 
In general, environmental goals should be 
prioritized based on a ranking of environ-
mental benefit per dollar invested in the 
improvement. However, it may well be that 
the benefits that are generated by reducing 
chemical runoff in the Midwest are signifi-
cant but accrue primarily to people living in 
the Gulf states. For this reason, policies that 
address hypoxia in the Gulf may not be 
politically palatable from the perspective of 
local Midwest farmers but may generate a 
larger social return per conservation pay-
ment dollar.  
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Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico pro-
vides a clear example of the latter case. 
The geographical separation between 
where the chemical runoff occurs (in the 
Midwest) and where the damage accrues 
(in the Gulf of Mexico) raises the issue of 
whether policymakers may wish to con-
sider the incidence of costs and benefits 
when designing environmental policies, 
and what level of government (local, state, 
or federal) is most appropriate to allocate 
conservation funds.  
Considering two extremes illustrates the 
trade-off between local and national control 
of conservation payment funding. At one 
extreme, conservation payments might be 
allocated to state or local government 
agencies with few restrictions on how funds 
should be used. The advantage of this 
design is that localized information will be 
used to direct funds and manage environ-
mental improvements. The associated 
disadvantage is that projects that provide 
national benefits are likely to be overlooked 
in favor of projects that provide only local 
benefits. Of course, compromise policies 
can also be designed where, for example, 
some payments are earmarked to address 
specific national environmental goals while 
other funds are controlled by state and local 
governments to focus on local environ-
mental and income transfer goals. 
International Trade Policy and        
Conservation Payments 
Domestic agricultural policy should be 
consistent with international agreements and 
policy. Policies that harm the interests of 
international trading partners will be met 
with resistance, raising the costs of adminis-
tering a conservation payments program.  
A first important issue is whether conser-
vation payments will be consistent with the 
rules set by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The WTO, through the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture, provides 
some discipline and guidance on which forms 
of environmental payments are acceptable 
and which are not. The Uruguay Round aims 
to reduce direct trade distortions and to put a 
cap on production-enhancing/distorting 
policies, which depress world prices.  
As a general principle, environmental 
payments are allowed (they fit into the so-
called green box) under these criteria: they 
must be decoupled (are not production 
enhancing), cannot involve transfers from 
consumers (do not raise prices), and cannot 
exceed the cost or revenue loss incurred by 
farmers in complying. The Conservation 
Reserve Program, Wetland Reserve Pro-
gram, and Environmental Quality Incentive 
Program have been identified as green-box 
policies. The United States has almost 
doubled its assistance to farmers through 
green-box payments since 1988 to about $51 
billion in the late 1990s.  
Even though programs meet the green-
box criteria, one could argue that it is 
impossible to design truly decoupled 
policies. For example, many of the compo-
nents of the proposed Conservation Secu-
rity Act of 2000 (United States Congress) 
are “decoupled” in the sense that they do 
not alter production incentives at the 
margin for existing farmers. But virtually 
all policies leading to additional payments, 
even “decoupled” policies, are trade 
distorting to the extent that they influence 
entry/exit decisions by maintaining farmers 
in production who would otherwise exit the 
industry.  
The second question addressed is the 
impact of conservation payments on com-
petitiveness. Here, we can look to existing 
environmental programs to gain some 
insight into the potential effects of conserva-
tion payments. Existing programs to reduce 
soil erosion and water contamination with 
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buffer strips are voluntary, select farmers 
with low abatement costs, and provide 
compensation for the income loss; hence, 
they probably do not significantly affect 
competitiveness. However, the CRP and 
other large conservation programs increase 
land value, thus decreasing competitiveness 
on international markets. For example, the 
CRP currently enrolls 31.4 million acres, 
representing about 11 percent of the total 
area devoted to the 15 major crops. Such 
extensive programs reduce output, increase 
world price moderately, and increase land 
value through capitalization of payments. 
Like the CRP, a large conservation pay-
ments program likely would have notable 
effects on land prices. However, it is impor-
tant to point out that competitiveness is a 
relative concept. If all exporting countries 
face tighter environmental standards, market 
shares are little affected. Therefore, it is 
doubtful that environmental standards in 
agriculture have had a significant impact on 
international competitiveness, first because 
the share of the “environmental” input in total 
cost of production is small, and second 
because the increased stringency is occurring 
in most countries (Beghin and Metcalfe). 
 
IV. Design and Implementation Issues in a  
Conservation Payment Program 
The success of a conservation payment 
program depends critically on its design and 
implementation. The design choices will 
ultimately affect the ease of implementation, 
and details of both design and implementa-
tion will have important consequences for 
the total environmental gains from the 
program, how these gains are distributed 
geographically, and who receives the 
payments.  
Key Design Issues 
In identifying the key issues, we have 
attempted to pay particular attention to 
those that seem most crucial to the success 
of the program, particularly as it relates to 
seeing real gains in environmental quality, 
as well as the income transfer aspect of the 
program. 
1. Establishing the Baseline. The least-
cost approach of improving environmental 
quality requires that conservation payments 
reward “new” environmentally friendly 
activities that otherwise would not be 
undertaken. In other words, from a pure 
static efficiency perspective, or to satisfy 
Objectives 1 and 2, the payments should 
induce “new” activities and not reward 
environmentally friendly activities that have 
already been undertaken without the pay-
ments. Of course, this has important 
implications for public perception and may 
be perceived as unfair to good stewards. 
However, an efficiency problem associated 
with making payments for only new activi-
ties also arises in that farmers who have 
already adopted such activities may tempo-
rarily end their conserving practices so that 
they can become “new adopters,” thereby 
qualifying to receive payments. This is an 
example of slippage and is clearly ineffi-
cient. Incentives in the conservation pro-
gram should be designed to discourage such 
behavior. (Note that the slippage issue 
would not arise if a tax were used, that is, if 
farmers who do not adopt the activities are 
taxed.) This can be done through properly 
choosing a baseline for the program. 
A baseline determines “how new” a cer-
tain activity must be to be eligible for 
conservation payments. The simplest 
baseline may reward the activity without 
considering its starting date. For example, 
the government may simply reward conser-
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vation tillage, regardless of how long the 
practice has been adopted. On the other 
hand, the government may choose to reward 
only new activities under the program. For 
instance, it may reward conservation tillage 
adopted on lands that have been using 
conventional tillage continuously for a 
certain number of years in the past. 
In practice, the baseline will likely depend 
on the importance of Objective 3 and the 
extent to which questions of fairness dictate 
rewarding early and new adopters. Choosing a 
baseline will involve trading off the program 
cost against equity. These trade-offs are 
substantial. In one study focused on carbon 
sequestration, the authors found that paying 
all farmers for carbon gains would require a 
budget three times larger than if only new 
adopters were paid (Pautsch et al. 2001). 
2. Performance- versus Practice-Based 
Instruments and the Nonpoint Nature of 
Environmental Services from Agriculture. A 
critical feature of a conservation payment 
program is the form of the instrument that is 
used to convey the payments. To satisfy 
Objective 1, the fundamental variable of 
interest is the flow of environmental services 
from the farming practices, such as the 
lowered pesticide runoff due to the use of 
precision technologies (for example, IPM and 
drip irrigation), the increased rate of carbon 
sequestration from conservation tillage, and 
so forth. Performance-based instruments 
determine payments according to the flow, 
thus targeting the environmental service 
directly, and can be cost effective in that the 
marginal costs of producing the environ-
mental services are equalized across farmers. 
However, such instruments require the 
direct monitoring of the flow of pollutants, 
which is often difficult or impractical. Many 
agricultural pollutants are nonpoint in nature 
(it is difficult to identify the exact field or 
source from which the effluent or service 
flows) and/or are ephemeral (the flow rate 
must be measured at the moment of release). 
Examples are methane emission from 
livestock, air pollution from farming equip-
ment, and nutrient contributions to surface 
waters. Both of these factors suggest that 
direct monitoring of the services would be 
very expensive, necessitating the use of 
other instruments that require only indirect 
methods of monitoring. 
Indirect monitoring refers to the 
monitoring of farmer activities that 
contribute to the flow of environmental 
services and is required by practice-based 
instruments that reward farmers for their 
activities. For example, instead of directly 
measuring the carbon flow into and out of 
the agricultural soil, an agency can measure 
the soil characteristics and the farming 
practice, and rely on some scientific model 
that links these factors to the flow of 
services. The payments to farmers are then 
determined based on the model and farmer 
activity (such as tillage practices). The major 
advantage of practice-based instruments lies 
with the relative ease of monitoring and 
enforcement. Models related to pesticides, 
water pollutants, and soil erosion, among 
others, are also available.4 
For practice-based instruments to per-
form well, it is important to understand the 
relationship between the practices and the 
environmental services so that the appropri-
ate payment schedules can be constructed. 
As noted earlier, this relationship will often 
need to be based on scientific models rather 
than on direct measurements. The relation-
ship will typically depend on regional or 
local characteristics, such as soil type and 
crops grown, and it will be subject to 
random weather shocks such as temperature, 
rainfall, and wind.  
The efficiency of practice-based instru-
ments depends to a large extent on the 
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accuracy of the relationship. There are two 
types of errors in deciding the rewards for 
certain farmer activities. The first occurs 
when an environmentally beneficial practice 
is adopted but not rewarded, and the second 
occurs when a reward is provided but the 
practice is not adopted. In general, given the 
inherent uncertainty in scientific models, 
one type of error can be reduced only at the 
expense of the other type. Thus, if the 
government wants to minimize the first type 
of error, it is likely to make some payments 
that bring little or no environmental benefits. 
Both error types can be reduced, however, if 
the scientific model accuracy is enhanced. 
Unlike performance-based instruments, 
when there is significant heterogeneity in 
activities and their environmental benefits 
across regions, practice-based instruments 
should be designed to vary across regions in 
response to the heterogeneity. For example, 
the environmental benefits of conservation 
tillage, such as soil erosion and carbon 
sequestration, are likely to vary significantly 
across regions. Increased heterogeneity in 
the rate structure can enhance the efficiency 
of the payment but also incurs higher 
transaction costs. Again, the benefits and 
costs should be balanced in determining the 
rate structure. 
3. Targeting Benefits and Costs in Mak-
ing Payments. To meet Objective 1, conser-
vation payments should go first to producers 
who offer the greatest amount of environ-
mental benefits per dollar of payment. That 
is, program payments under an efficient 
program would need to be both geographi-
cally and economically targeted. Geographic 
targeting accounts for spatial heterogeneity 
in environmental benefits offered due to 
variations in soil, climate, and other land-
scape variations. Economic targeting ac-
counts for variability among farm managers 
and farm operations in terms of their will-
ingness to adopt conservation practices. In 
an ideal world, targeting payments to 
producers who offer the highest environ-
mental benefit-to-cost ratios makes the most 
efficient use of a fixed program budget.  
But successful implementation of such a 
program would require estimates of the 
quantities of environmental benefits avail-
able on a particular site if a conservation 
practice were adopted, as well as estimates 
of the relative willingness of the site’s 
producer to adopt the practice. Conceptually, 
combining models of adoption behavior with 
crop growth/environmental simulation 
models that estimate the environmental 
impacts of cropping and conservation 
practices could yield these estimates. In 
reality, basing payment rates on estimated 
site- and producer-specific benefit-cost 
ratios is probably not practical given the lack 
of precision with which the ratios can be 
estimated. An alternative would follow the 
example of the Conservation Reserve 
Program and allow farmers to bid on will-
ingness to adopt practices. This would help 
reveal their adoption preferences. Then the 
simulation models could be used solely to 
estimate the environmental impacts of 
adoption. Bids would be accepted according 
to the resulting benefit-cost ratios. 
4. Jurisdiction. The next issue in design-
ing a conservation payment program relates 
to which level of the government should be 
responsible for the program design, the 
degree to which activities are to be re-
warded, the rate structure, monitoring, and 
enforcement. Adequate consideration should 
be given to the information available and to 
the costs and incentives of performing the 
functions for each level of the government. 
Lower levels of government (state and local 
agencies) in general have better information 
about farmer activities and incur lower costs 
to monitor them. They may also know more 
about the environmental benefits of these 
activities if the benefits are local. However, 
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as noted earlier, local government may not 
give adequate attention to pollutants that are 
global or regional and to the program costs 
if the federal government finances the 
conservation payments. 
5. Tradable Conservation Credits.    
Traditionally, environmental regulation in 
agriculture and in general has relied heavily 
on command-and-control approaches, such 
as standards. Recently, market-based 
instruments, such as emission charges and 
tradable emission permits, are increasingly 
being used in air pollution control (such as 
the sulfur trading) and even in water 
pollution control. The use of market-based 
instruments faces more challenge in agri-
culture because of the nonpoint source 
nature of many agricultural pollutants. 
Rather than specifying a payment for a 
particular performance or practice, a 
tradable permit or credit system could 
require that farmers meet a particular 
standard for performance. If farmers do 
better than the standard (that is, achieve 
greater environmental gains or pollute less 
than required), they would then be able to 
sell their credits at market prices. Con-
versely, farmers who do not wish to adopt 
activities that will meet the standard could 
purchase credits from the market, effec-
tively paying others to provide the envi-
ronmental services.  
The advantage of tradable credits is that 
they directly limit the amount of pollution 
while being cost effective. Farmers who can 
provide environmental services cheaply will 
do so and sell their “excess” to higher-cost 
providers; farmers maintain flexibility in 
deciding how to produce the services. 
However, tradable permits work most 
directly in the context of a performance-
based instrument and will be more difficult 
to implement with a practice-based strategy. 
Permits can either be grandfathered by the 
government or auctioned off to farmers. So 
far, emissions permits in practice in the 
U.S. have primarily been grandfathered. 
The efficiency of the permit system is 
independent of the initial allocation; 
however, there are important income 
distribution issues associated with the 
initial allocation because permits are 
valuable. Clearly, income support goals 
would dictate giving permits or credits to 
farmer directly rather than selling them 
initially. To the extent that political lobby-
ing by interest groups may occur to influ-
ence the pattern of initial allocation, the 
success of a trading system may depend on 
the allocation. 
In principle, permits can be traded if the 
pollutants are homogeneous in that they 
cause the same environmental damage. For 
example, farmers above the same aquifer 
can trade permits that allow emissions to 
pollute groundwater. However, if the 
emissions pollute different aquifers, it would 
not be appropriate to allow permits to be 
traded across aquifers. If a trading area 
becomes small, the permit market may be 
too thin, reducing the effectiveness of the 
trading program.  
Further, farmers in different regions may 
pollute the same river but at different intensi-
ties, with emissions from those further away 
polluting the river less intensely. In that case, 
ambient permits may have to be used that 
explicitly treat the different impacts of the 
pollutants from different farmers. Such a 
trading system may be quite complicated and 
difficult to implement. 
 A credit program has another advantage 
in that it would allow easy integration of the 
agricultural sector into a broader environ-
mental market. For example, if farmers 
generate carbon credits, they might then be 
able to sell those credits to an energy com-
pany or other firm. Although there is cur-
rently no formal market for carbon credits, 
CARD/ ISU Econ. / 15 
 
 
firms wishing to appear “green” and future 
environmental regulations could potentially 
provide sizable markets for credits. 
Key Implementation Issues 
Once a program has been designed, a variety 
of problems associated with implementation 
will need to be addressed. The first issue, 
and one of overarching concern to any 
conservation payments program, relates to 
the ability of the agency charged with 
implementation to monitor the environ-
mental gains. As we shall see, this can be 
problematic for environmental quality 
associated with agriculture. 
1. Monitoring and Verification. The ease 
of carrying out the task of monitoring and 
verification will depend critically on whether 
a performance- or practice-based system is 
adopted. Even for practice-based payments, 
monitoring and enforcement will not be 
trivial activities. Various practices differ in 
the ease with which they can be monitored. 
Generally, discrete actions, such as tillage 
practices, irrigation equipment, and buffer 
strips, are easier to monitor as they involve 
only a small number of actions. Continuous 
actions, such as the amount of fertilizer and 
pesticide used, are more difficult to monitor. 
Similarly, imprinted actions can be monitored 
for a while after the actions take place and as 
a result are easier to monitor. Examples 
include technology choices (by examining 
the equipment), and tillage practices (by 
examining the field). On the other hand, 
ephemeral actions are more difficult to 
monitor. Of course, many actions fall be-
tween these extremes. 
Monitoring can take place continuously 
(for example, water meters) or discretely 
(for example, sampling of irrigation equip-
ment). The choice of monitoring equipment 
depends to a large extent on the nature of the 
action, especially whether it is ephemeral or 
imprinted, and the costs of monitoring. 
Different monitoring methods can also be 
combined. The final choice should balance 
the costs and the accuracy. 
Because monitoring and its verification 
or auditing is costly, who conducts the 
monitoring and auditing may directly affect 
a program’s performance. Parties who could 
potentially conduct these functions include 
government agencies, private companies, or 
farmers themselves. For example, farmers 
can report their practices to obtain conserva-
tion payments, and either a government 
agency or a certified private company can 
conduct (periodic) auditing.  
A critical issue in determining whom to 
monitor is to balance the costs of monitoring 
and the incentives of the parties to misre-
port. The government can promote truthful 
reporting either by careful auditing and/or 
by providing appropriate incentives or 
designing efficient contracts, as discussed 
later on.  
2. Enforcement. The ease of enforcing a 
conservation payment program depends 
directly on the effectiveness of monitoring 
and verification, on the accuracy of the 
scientific models used to make payments, and 
on the complexity of the payment rate struc-
ture. Enforcement will be more difficult as the 
payment rate increases, as monitoring and 
verification are less precise, and as the 
scientific model is influenced more by 
random shocks. Conservation payments 
should reflect the actual environmental 
benefits more closely as enforcement be-
comes stricter. However, increased enforce-
ment is costly, so the gains in environmental 
benefits need to be carefully compared to the 
costs in making decisions about how carefully 
to enforce the provisions of a conservation 
payments program.  
Enforcement involves two elements: 
the probability that any cheating behavior 
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is detected through activities such as 
auditing, and the size of the penalty when 
cheating is caught. Increasing the probabil-
ity of catching any cheating activities may 
require higher enforcement cost, while the 
size of the penalty is limited by legal and 
political restrictions.  
Voluntariness and Distributional Aspects 
of Conservation Payment Designs 
Before leaving issues related to implemen-
tation and design, we briefly consider 
some of the implications for income 
transfers and the voluntary nature of 
conservation payment programs. In theory, 
similar environmental improvements can 
be achieved regardless of whether a 
program is voluntary or required. The only 
difference lies in who pays for the im-
provement. In a voluntary program, 
taxpayers (or whoever funds the required 
subsidies) pay for environmental im-
provement. In a required program, farmers 
pay (or are penalized for lack of perform-
ance). Because similar outcomes can be 
achieved with either type of program, the 
choice between voluntary and required is 
usually thought to be simply a matter of 
who owns the “property right” for pollut-
ing. That is, do farmers have the right to 
pollute, or do nonfarmers have the right to 
a clean environment?  
Depending on the form of conservation 
payments, income could also be redistrib-
uted within the farming sector. If conserva-
tion payments were based on the number of 
acres on which particular practices are 
adopted or on the total amount of environ-
mental services produced, then more pay-
ments would likely flow to large farms. 
However, it is critical to understand that, by 
providing a return to the land, conservation 
payments can be expected to be factored into  
the expected income from farming the land, 
and land prices will increase to reflect that 
value. Thus, in the long run, it is the land-
owners who ultimately receive the income 
support. To the extent that landowners and 
farmers are different people, this is impor-
tant to recognize when considering possible 
income support goals.  
The impact on land values and the mag-
nitude of the impact would depend on the 
type of program that was initiated. With a 
targeted approach, land that provides more 
environmental services will receive higher 
payments. If, on average, this corresponds to 
lower quality agricultural lands, conserva-
tion payments will result in an equalizing 
effect on land values between types of land. 
In contrast, if higher quality lands provide 
higher environmental services, price differ-
ences between land qualities will be ac-
cented. In this way, conservation payments 
may have important distributional conse-
quences within the agricultural sector. When 
the CRP bids were first accepted in 1986, 
theycreated a floor on land prices equal to 
the present value of the 10 years of CRP 
annual per-acre payments. 
The impact of a conservation payment 
scheme on rural viability is unclear. To the 
extent that conservation payments improve 
the quality of the environment and the 
quality of life in rural areas, more people 
may be attracted to living in rural areas, 
thereby improving the viability of rural 
communities. On the other hand, if conser-
vation payments should be structured so that 
large farms are favored, there may be 
pressure for further enlargement of farms, 
thereby possibly reducing the number of 
farmers and rural viability. Caps on the total 
payments allowed per farm could counter 
this effect.  
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V. Lessons from the Past, Costs, and Environmental  
Effectiveness of Conservation Programs 
In this section, we look to experience with 
previous conservation programs to see what 
lessons can be learned in shaping future 
policy. Next, we look to the empirical 
environmental economics literature to 
consider the likely costs and benefits of 
acquiring environmental services with 
conservation payments. Here, we consider 
the retrospective evidence concerning land 
retirement programs (primarily CRP) to 
assess the effectiveness of these programs in 
achieving environmental gains. Next, we 
look at studies that have been undertaken to 
assess the likely (or actual) gains from 
policies that change land use practices on 
lands kept in agricultural production. 
Lessons from Previous  
Conservation Programs 
The discussion so far makes clear that, at 
least conceptually, a wide variety of 
options (each with different distributional 
implications) are available for achieving 
conservation objectives. In practice, 
however, conservation programs in the 
United States have been limited mostly to 
land set-asides, to cost sharing for adoption 
of conservation measures, and to “cross 
compliance,” where compliance with 
particular conservation measures is a 
requirement for participation in farm 
income-support programs. In this section, 
we briefly discuss the U.S. experience with 
this restricted set of policy instruments. 
1. Land Set-Asides. Efficient design of 
programs that provide direct payment for 
land set-asides requires information about 
the conservation benefits of setting land 
aside, and about the opportunity cost of land 
set aside. As noted earlier, recent rounds of 
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
have used an environmental benefits indica-
tor (EBI) as a proxy for conservation 
benefits and have effectively elicited 
information about costs by employing an 
auction to allocate set-aside acres. For a 
given level of EBI, farmers who are most 
willing to set land aside (that is, who have 
the lowest land costs) are likely to submit 
low bids relative to others and therefore to 
be awarded set-aside acreage. 
While superior in design to earlier 
rounds (where there was no EBI, and where 
farmers uniformly bid at county-level “bid 
caps”), there is still considerable room for 
improvement. In particular, some believe 
that the current EBI reflects both conserva-
tion benefits from land set aside and political 
economy considerations arising from 
concern about the distribution of program 
benefits across the country. If this is indeed 
the case, allocating fixed amounts to various 
regions and allowing each region to design 
its own EBI can more efficiently achieve a 
similar end. Also, there has been very little 
research regarding efficient auction design 
in the context of land set-asides.  
Recent experience from government-
sponsored auctions in other industries (for 
example, telecommunications) suggests that 
substantial benefits can be garnered from 
careful auction design. For example, the 
auction approach used by USDA allows 
only a single bid entry by each farmer, rather 
than giving farmers an opportunity to bid 
more competitively in response to others’ 
bids. That is, the USDA/CRP auction is 
static, rather than sequential.  
There are also important improvements 
to the EBI that could be addressed. First, for 
some environmental benefits, such as 
wildlife habitat, the benefit of setting aside 
contiguous land is high relative to setting 
aside noncontiguous land. This could be 
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reflected in a bidding procedure by appro-
priately modifying growers’ EBIs to reflect 
such benefits. Second, a more careful 
development of the EBI based on the value 
of services generated by various practices 
would increase efficiency. Third, more 
attention to the regional variability in 
benefits of various practices would also 
likely improve the efficiency of the program. 
Of course, these design improvements 
would be costly to implement, and the 
benefits of improved design must be 
weighed against these costs.  
2. Cost Sharing and Incentive Pay-
ments. Conservation benefits can also be 
obtained from farmland that remains in 
production. As with land set-asides, an 
efficient allocation of funds toward conser-
vation projects depends on the costs and 
benefits of project adoption across farms. 
Although there are a variety of specific 
“cost-sharing” programs administered at 
both the federal and state levels, they all 
have a similar structure. Farmers are offered 
fixed per-acre amounts for adoption of 
specific management practices (or some 
combination of practices) and shares of the 
installation cost for other conservation 
measures (for example, a manure storage 
facility). Unlike the CRP, there have been 
only limited attempts to ensure that program 
payments are allocated efficiently. EQIP 
(Environmental Quality Incentive Program) 
is a recent exception, though even here it’s 
not clear that program design fully reflects 
its stated objective (to maximize environ-
mental benefit per dollar expended).  
There are at least two ways that such 
programs could be improved. First, payment 
could be made to vary with measures of 
conservation performance. This could occur 
with direct pay-for-performance (for exam-
ple, dollars per ton of soil erosion reduction) 
or indirectly with per-acre payments varying 
according to conservation performance.   
Alternatively, conservation project dol-
lars could be auctioned with an approach 
similar to that used in the CRP. Rather than 
submit bids for land set-asides, farmers 
could submit bids for (possibly multiyear) 
conservation projects. The benefit of this 
approach would be to encourage competition 
for project dollars. 
3. Conservation Compliance. “Conser-
vation compliance” refers to the tying of 
traditional farm program benefits to satisfy-
ing a set of conservation requirements. In 
the past, federal farm programs benefiting 
producers existed independently of conser-
vation programs. With conservation compli-
ance requirements these programs provided 
a way to penalize bad performance while 
simultaneously rewarding good perform-
ance. This provides an interesting solution to 
the issue raised earlier of not wanting to 
discriminate against early adopters of 
conservation practices. It requires, of course, 
that there be a significant traditional subsidy 
program in existence and it cannot be 
implemented on crops for which subsidies 
are not provided. 
Costs and Benefits from Land        
Retirement Programs 
Claassen et al. (2001) report U.S. conserva-
tion expenditures from 1983-2000. The CRP 
is at present the major conservation program 
in the United States, and since 1986 land 
retirement programs (CRP and wetlands 
reserve programs) have accounted for 
roughly 70 percent of all conservation 
expenditures. Information and technical 
assistance programs account for another 20 
percent, and cost share and incentive pay-
ments programs make up the remaining 10 
percent. There have been several methods 
used to entice farmer participation in the 
CRP and other programs, including annual 
payments for a fixed period of time, perpet-
ual easements, one-time payments, and cost 
sharing arrangements. 
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Since the beginning of the program, 
about 10 percent of U.S. cropland (36 
million acres) has been enrolled in CRP 
(Osborn, Llacuna, and Linsenbigler, as 
reported in Claassen et al. 2001). Some 91 
million acres were meeting conservation 
compliance in 1997. These two conservation 
programs are believed to be the major 
reasons for the nearly 40 percent reduction 
of the total erosion on U.S. cropland be-
tween 1982 and 1997. The reduction in soil 
erosion is associated with reduced siltation 
and eutrophication of waterways, reductions 
in air pollution from soil particles, improved 
landscape aesthetics, and more regional 
biodiversity. 
Estimates of the value of these reductions 
are substantial. Hyberg (1997), as reported in 
Claassen et al. (2001), estimates that conser-
vation compliance provides nonmarket 
benefits of $1.4 billion/year due to the 
reduction in soil erosion. Likewise, the CRP 
is estimated to provide some $694 mil-
lion/year nonmarket benefits due to soil 
erosion reduction. This number includes 
freshwater-based recreation benefits of $129 
million/year, increases to soil productivity of 
$145 million/year, impacts to costs of mu-
nicipal water cleaning and dredging of $366 
million/year, and health impacts of $50 
million/year (see Claassen et al. 2001 for 
references to specific studies). Feather et al. 
(1999) further estimate the benefits of wildlife 
viewing and pheasant hunting on CRP to be 
$704 million/year. These estimated benefits 
compare favorably with the payments of some 
$1.4 billion being made to CRP land users in 
2000 (FSA 2000). 
Despite these impressive numbers, some 
research has questioned the cost-
effectiveness of the CRP. Smith (1995) 
estimates that an upper bound on the cost of 
retiring 34 million acres is about $1 billion, 
a savings of approximately $600 million per 
year. Thus, he suggests, the CRP clearly 
acted as an income transfer program, and 
environmental services could have been 
achieved for less. Of course, this is not a 
problematic feature of the program if 
income transfer is a dual or even primary 
objective. 
Research further suggests that targeting 
can increase environmental benefits while 
preserving income support levels for farmers 
(Hansen, Feather, and Shank 1999; Feather 
et al. 1999; Babcock et al. 1996). Feather et 
al. (1999) estimate that the value of the 
environmental services from more effective 
targeting of the CRP would roughly double. 
Overall, the literature suggests that land 
retirement is expensive, though effective, in 
providing environmental services. The 
performance of CRP likely could be further 
improved through better targeting.  
Costs and Benefits from Programs that 
Alter Agricultural Production Practices 
Rather than remove land from agricultural 
production, conservation payment programs 
may focus on payments for practices that are 
employed in conjunction with agricultural 
production. Here, we summarize some of the 
empirical evidence available to indicate 
whether such benefits are likely to be 
substantive. Since few direct payments have 
been made for changes in farming practices, 
these studies are primarily prospective. 
Sinner (1990) argues that a $200 million 
subsidy targeted to environmentally friendly 
practices, such as low-till, could have ap-
proximately the same effect on soil erosion as 
$2 billion spent through the CRP for land 
retirement. Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 
(2001) provide estimates of the payments 
needed to induce farmers in Iowa to adopt 
low-tillage practices. They estimate that 
payments of $3 per acre could increase the 
adoption rate to 66.2 percent from its current 
rate of 57.1 percent. A payment of $5 per 
acre could achieve a 71.7 percent adoption.  
20 / Conservation Payments: Challenges in Design and Implementation 
 
Currently, land use payment policies in 
effect include EQIP and WHIP (wildlife 
habitat incentives program). These policy 
tools provide payments to agricultural 
producers to offset the costs of adopting 
specified best management practices. Under 
these policies, farmers sign contracts for 5 to 
10 years. Since the beginning, land users 
have shown a great interest in the program, 
and the demand for the EQIP contracts well 
exceeds the funds available. While estimates 
of the EQIP realized benefits are not avail-
able, at the time the policy was proposed it 
was estimated that the overall benefit-to-cost 
ratio would be 1.46. 
WHIP is a voluntary program for farm-
ers who want to develop and improve 
wildlife habitat, primarily on private lands. 
Participants prepare a wildlife habitat 
development plan. Similar to EQIP, the 
WHIP contracts generally last from 5 to 10 
years, and USDA agrees to provide technical 
assistance and pay up to 75 percent of the 
cost of installing the wildlife habitat prac-
tices. For the WHIP, some $20 million was 
distributed to states for financial and techni-
cal assistance in 1999. By 1999, 3,855 long-
term agreements were approved, enrolling 
721,240 acres in the program nationally.  
Although no current policies to curb 
greenhouse gas emissions currently exist in 
the United States, a number of studies have 
been performed to estimate the likely costs 
and environmental gains from adopting 
various policies to encourage adoption of 
climate friendly agricultural practices. 
Pautsch et al. (2001) examine various policy  
instruments that promote carbon sequestra-
tion in agricultural soils and mitigate green-
house gas emissions through increased 
adoption of conservation tillage. They find 
that, depending on the degree of targeting 
and the amount of carbon desired, agricul-
ture could provide carbon reductions at a 
cost from $20 per ton of carbon. Antle et al. 
(2000) find that continuous cropping can 
sequester carbon in the Great Plains at a cost 
between $5 and $70 per ton depending on 
area and degree of targeting of the pay-
ments. McCarl and Schneider (2000) 
provide a review of cost estimates for carbon 
emission reductions through sink enhance-
ments in forests and agriculture. They report 
costs, primarily for tree planting, ranging 
from $0 to $110 per ton of carbon. 
Finally, there is some empirical evi-
dence on the value of designing conserva-
tion payment programs that focus on 
multiple environmental benefits rather than 
targeting a single one. Connor, Perry, and 
Adams (1995), focusing on an important 
irrigated agricultural region of eastern 
Oregon, also find that potential environ-
mental benefits from coordinating erosion 
and nitrate leaching policies are large. For 
example, they find that an expenditure of 
$10/acre with the sole objective of control-
ling erosion in a cost-effective manner 
could reduce erosion by 49 percent but 
could increase nitrate leaching by 27 
percent. In contrast, the same expenditure 
could achieve an erosion reduction of 42 
percent and a nitrate leaching reduction of 
12 percent if an efficient mixed objective 
policy were used.
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VI. Concluding Comments 
As Congress rewrites farm legislation, many 
are pushing for a new partnership between 
farmers and taxpayers. In exchange for 
continued taxpayer support of farm incomes, 
farmers would do much more to enhance 
environmental quality. Congress needs to 
understand whether such a partnership might 
make sense, how such a partnership might be 
implemented, and the feasibility of farmers 
providing real environmental enhancement 
through changes in management practices 
and land use before it will be willing to 
depart from traditional income support 
policies. In this paper we have provided 
economists’ insights into these issues to help 
clarify the farm bill discussion. 
Clearly there are economic efficiency 
gains to be obtained by increasing conserva-
tion efforts by farmers if the transaction 
costs of program implementation are small 
relative to the value of the environmental 
gains. As public demands for clear air and 
clean water continue to increase, there is 
growing justification for tying federal farm 
income support to increased conservation. 
No trade-offs between income support goals 
and conservation objectives need to be 
made unless Congress adopts new means 
tests for eligibility, in which case conser-
vation will be concentrated on relatively 
small operations. Because much of agricul- 
tural conservation involves control of 
nonpoint source pollution and provision of 
geographically varied environmental 
benefits, the design and implementation of 
a successful conservation payment pro-
gram needs to account for possibly signifi-
cant transactions costs. Verification, 
monitoring, and enforcement costs could 
be greater than the value of the environ-
mental benefits obtainable from farmers. 
Past conservation programs show that 
farmers are willing to participate if the 
payments are large relative to the cost of 
compliance. Payments in excess of costs 
will help meet the twin goals of income 
support and conservation, but they count 
against our WTO limits on agricultural 
support.  
Of course, ultimately the farm bill is a 
political piece of legislation. The political 
calculus over the last few years has resulted 
in billions of dollars in federal farm aid with 
few strings attached. Whether the calculus 
has changed enough to increase the likeli-
hood of an altered course in farm policy 
depends on whether the political influence 
of those rural and urban constituencies that 
will benefit from increased on-farm conser-
vation has grown relative to the influence of 
the farm lobby, which is largely supporting 
the status quo for farm programs. 
  
VII. Endnotes 
1. It is likely that farmers would have taken into consideration the potential environmental damages to their 
on-farm water when making their fertilizer and pesticide use decisions. The difference, of course, is that 
the on-farm problems are borne directly by the farmer and are thus internalized in the farmer’s decision 
making, whereas the off-farm problems are external to the farmer and therefore not likely to be considered 
by the farmer.  
2. An important exception does exist. When payments to farms affect the ability of some farmers to stay in 
farming, payments versus taxes can have very different consequences, as payments might actually in-
crease the size of the farming sector and, with it, the size of the negative externalities. Taxes on negative 
externalities would be generally preferred in such a setting.  
3. Lewandrowski and Ingram provide a useful overview of the complexity of the relationship between 
agriculture and the environment. 
4. Carbon models include CENTURY and CQUESTER. Other environmental models include EPIC for 
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